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Analysing the Two-Level Game 
International and National Determinants of Change  
in Education Policy Making 
ABSTRACT 
Education policy making is often considered an exclusive domain of the nation state in 
western industrialised countries. Since the 1990s, however, international organisations 
(IOs) have started to play a greater role in the field of education by developing new 
forms of governance. As a consequence, the predominance of the nation state in educa-
tion becomes an increasingly contested issue. Yet, it is not clear what kind of effects IO 
governance will have, whether it brings about greater convergence among national edu-
cation policies by promoting uniform solutions for commonly shared problems, or 
whether national institutions continue to follow their own logic, thereby hindering equal 
responses to IO governance. In order to develop a better understanding of the dynamics 
in this two-level game, this paper sets out to develop an analytical framework for exam-
ining the interplay between international and national determinants of change in the 
field of education. We argue that IOs apply different governance instruments by which 
they seek to influence national education policy making. However, the degree to which 
nation states will respond to these international stimuli is likely to be mediated by na-
tional transformation capacities, most prominently veto players and nationally rooted 
ideas of education. Based on these basic assumptions, we develop a parsimonious mo-
del in which we assess the influence of IO governance on national education policy ma-
king mediated through national transformation capacities. 
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Analysing the Two-Level Game 
International and National Determinants of Change  
in Education Policy Making1  
INTRODUCTION 
Education is often considered an exclusive domain of the nation state in western indus-
trialised countries. Since the rise of states in their modern form, national governments 
incorporated education into their canon of public goods: they began to actively regulate 
individual behaviour, to grant monetary transfers, and to provide services in a wide ar-
ray of social and economic spheres ranging from healthcare to social security, from la-
bour markets to education. As a consequence, education has become a „normative 
good” (Hurrelmann et al. 2007: 3) of the modern state. Today, it is the nation state 
which prominently decides over the structural set-up of education systems, mainly fi-
nances education for its citizens, and is often accountable for any achievements and 
pitfalls related to this field.2 This tight coupling between statehood and education has 
become dominant even on a world societal level (Meyer, Ramirez and Soysal 1992) and 
is almost a taken-for-granted condition.  
Since the 1990s, however, new actors and new forms of governance have begun to 
emerge in the field of education, which are likely to challenge the nation state’s author-
ity in educational matters (Leuze, Martens and Rusconi 2007). In particular, interna-
tional organisations (IOs) have started to play a greater role in this field. IOs already 
active in education widened their scope of action and undertook new activities, while 
IOs not previously engaged in this field prominently included education in their agenda. 
UNESCO, for example, has been one of the oldest and most wide-ranging organisations 
active in education policy. Since its foundation in 1945, this United Nations’ special 
agency has developed and proposed conventions, resolutions and recommendations for 
its member states in the field of education (McNeely and Cha 1994). Today, UNESCO 
also shapes policy concepts by promoting lifelong learning or by establishing world-
                                                 
1  We would like to thank Jürgen Enders, Katrin Toens, Heiko Walkenhorst and the two reviewers of the TransState 
Working Paper Series for valuable comments on previous drafts of this paper. For assistance in preparing the pa-
per, we thank Jega Arumugarajah, Jonna Blanck, Celia Enders, and Sebastian Juhnke. 
2  Historically, the high responsibility of nation states for education matters is only a young phenomenon. In the 
middle ages, for example, education governance took place under the canopy of the Christian curriculum and in-
stitutions, while the state was not at all involved (Weymann et al. 2007). Today, education is still provided to 
some extent by religious and / or private providers; yet, their share is comparatively small, even in the US 
(Sackmann 2007) and the overall responsibility of education policy lies in the hands of national governments.  
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wide applicable quality assurance systems (Hartmann 2007). But also IOs, which tradi-
tionally did not have a mandate for education, such as the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO) or the World Bank, are today engaged in education projects through activi-
ties ranging from their own training centres to educational consulting to financing edu-
cation reforms in the developing world (Jones 1992). The rising influence of IOs in the 
field of education is not restricted to a particular geographic area or specific sector of 
education but presents a widespread phenomenon: the number of participating countries 
in Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2006 has, for example, in-
creased to 57 states, including 27 non-members of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD); membership in the Bologna Process also tran-
scends the EU boundaries and today covers 46 countries, including Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, or Moldova. IOs have thus led to an increasing internationalisation of education by 
widening their scope of action, by shifting the cognitive horizon beyond national bor-
ders and by providing regionally or universally applicable models for education.  
As a consequence of these new international developments the predominance of the 
nation state in education becomes an increasingly contested issue, leading to major re-
forms of national education systems. So far, empirical studies indicate that IOs primar-
ily result in changes of national education policies and politics due to the specific nature 
of strategies applied as well as due to the special role of education for national identities 
(Martens and Wolf 2006).3 The combination of these two dimensions encompasses what 
we define as education policy making on the national level. First of all, IOs strongly 
influence the content of educational debates and reform projects and therefore have the 
capacity to initiate changes of national education policy, be it the overarching goals that 
guide policy in the field of education, the techniques or instruments used to attain those 
goals, or the precise setting of these instruments (see Hall 1993). For example, IOs cre-
ate new policy goals by initiating new debates and by promoting new ideas in the field 
of education. Most prominently, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) has triggered major debates about the effectiveness and efficiency 
                                                 
3  According to the three classical dimensions of policy fields (Alemann 1994; Böhret, Jann and Kronenwett 1988; 
Rohe 1994) politics refer to the procedural/actor dimension, policy to the content dimension, and polity to the in-
stitutional dimension of policy making. IO governance in the field of education currently only affects the first two 
dimensions, since soft governance capacities, such as discursive idea dissemination, administrative and logistic 
support or financial resources, lack the impetus of changing a country's overall institutional framework of policy 
making, be it constitution, organisation of legislative and executive systems or juridical independence. Neverthe-
less, the overall institutional framework of national states has been changed in other policy fields due to the influ-
ence of IOs, which are not as tightly bound to national integrity and identity, e.g. human rights and economic pol-
icy. 
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of secondary schooling in different countries with the launch of its Programme for In-
ternational Student Assessment (PISA) (Enders 2006; Martens and Wolf 2006; Rinne, 
Kallo and Hokka 2004). Moreover, new instruments and settings may evolve from IO 
standard setting and benchmarking. The Bologna Process and the closely related Lisbon 
Agenda of the European Union (EU) not only influenced national policy goals, but 
clearly affect policy instruments and settings by proposing a completely new structure 
of higher education systems throughout Europe (Balzer and Rusconi 2007; Corbett 
2005; Walkenhorst 2007).  
Yet, by promoting new policies in the field of education, IOs have also the capacity 
to change the very nature of domestic education politics, i.e. the decision making proc-
ess, the actors involved in the decision making process, and the nature of the formal and 
informal procedures that are followed to reach a decision. In addition to national policy 
makers, IOs today increasingly initiate and prepare policy in the field of education. At 
the same time societal actors, such as professions and trade associations, become more 
strongly involved in education decision making processes. The Bologna Process, for 
example, led to a stronger inclusion of international actors like the European Commis-
sion as well as of civil society such as the European Students' Union (ESU) or the Euro-
pean University Association (EUA) in higher education policy. But the emergence of 
new political actors also implies changes in the process of decision making itself: IO 
activities such as conference organisation or standard setting, heave important steps of 
the preparation of education reform projects onto the international level. The most re-
markable example of rising IO activity in education politics is the European Commis-
sion, which in the course of a few years has become the principal coordinating agent of 
the Bologna Process and the Lisbon Agenda (Balzer and Rusconi 2007).  
By and large, IOs have gained greater influence in education policy making. So far, 
however, these new actors in the field of education are only emerging; their impact on 
education policy making has just begun. Yet, although the nation state has lost its exclu-
sive position, it is unlikely that these new actors will govern this policy field alone. It is 
therefore not clear what kind of effects this internationalisation of the field of education 
will have: Will IOs bring about greater convergence among their member states by 
promoting uniform solutions for commonly shared problems? Or will the stimuli given 
by IOs be mediated by national institutions, which follow their own logic, thereby hin-
dering equal responses to IO governance? In order to develop a better understanding of 
the dynamics in this two-level game, this paper sets out to develop an analytical frame-
work for examining the interplay between international and national determinants of 
change in the field of education. The first section deals with the various forms of IO 
governance and how these are likely to affect the national level. We will argue that IOs 
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apply different governance instruments4 by which they seek to influence national educa-
tion policy making. These instruments range from soft mechanisms, such as discursive 
dissemination of new education goals, to technical and financial support, which are 
comparatively harder forms of compulsory regulations. As a consequence of the same 
international impetus, we assume that IO governance would, if unfiltered, result in con-
vergence of education policy making among IO member states since it provides the sa-
me stimulus for all countries. Yet, the convergence argument neglects the country-
specific historical development of institutions (Ebbinghaus 2005; Hurrelmann et al. 
2007; Streeck and Thelen 2005). We will argue that the degree to which nation states 
will respond to these international stimuli is likely to be mediated by – what we call – 
national transformation capacities5, most prominently veto players and nationally roo-
ted ideas of education. In the second part, we accordingly explore national veto players 
and national ideas of education in more detail: National ideas about education influence, 
for example, whether new education models proposed by IOs are compatible with na-
tional traditions, while the number of veto players determines whether reforms can be 
implemented easily or not. More generally, these national institutional configurations 
may block, hinder, but also promote reforms initiated by IO governance in the field of 
education. Instead of convergence, these national determinants of change may preserve 
cross-national differences or even cause further divergence of national paths. Based on 
these basic assumptions, we develop a parsimonious model in which we assess the in-
fluence of IO governance (independent variable) on national education policy making 
(dependent variable) mediated through national transformation capacities (intervening 
variable) (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: The two-level game in education policy making 
independent variable 
 
IO governance instruments 
intervening variable 
 
national transformation capacities 
dependent variable 
 
national education  
policy making 
 
                                                 
4  Governance refers to the process of policy making beyond traditional mechanisms of steering (see Jakobi, Mar-
tens and Wolf 2009, in preparation). Governance instruments are defined as means by which IOs actually seek to 
influence national policy making, i.e. to gain significant authority in the field of education. 
5  We call the national institutional configurations which have the capacity to initiate and carry out, but also to 
block or hinder processes of change national transformation capacities (see Weiss 1998). 
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In this paper, we thus eclectically bring together approaches of governance, veto players 
and ideas with concepts of diffusion and convergence. Examples of the influence of 
international organisations are given in order to illustrate the theoretical model to be 
developed. The graph developed in the final section of this paper will explain processes 
of convergence and divergence of national education policy making by combining our 
IO governance approach with that of national transformation capacities.  
IO GOVERNANCE INSTRUMENTS  
AS DRIVING FORCE OF POLITICAL CHANGE 
International Relations (IR) theory identifies different explanations for international 
cooperation as a source of national political change. By referring to changed societal 
conditions and the role that IOs play in political problem definition, our following ar-
guments draw on liberalism and constructivism (see e.g. Moravcsik 1997; Wendt 1992). 
In this section we closer investigate the governance instruments by which IOs seek to 
influence national policy making.6 Since the interplay of IOs and nation states cannot be 
satisfyingly grasped by applying the categories of ‘market, hierarchy or network’ alone, 
a typology is presented that lists more fine-tuned instruments IOs have at hand. The 
overall aim is to theoretically assess what IO influence might look like. But beforehand, 
we shortly discuss how and why IOs have gained access at all to the arena of education 
policy making. 
The fact that IOs are important players in the field of education is nowadays uncon-
tested in large parts of the literature, even if the influence varies across different IOs and 
different countries (Dale 2005; Dobbins 2009, forthcoming; Martens, Rusconi and Leu-
ze 2007). Most prominent examples for such increased activity are the OECD, the EU 
or the World Bank. All these organisations have been involved in education for some 
decades, but widely increased the scope of their educational projects in the course of the 
1990s. The causes of their activity are complex but can be attributed both to the national 
as well as the international level: On the national level, national governments sought to 
instrumentalise IOs for their own interests in order to overcome national reforms block-
ages and to push through unpopular reforms (Martens and Wolf 2006; Weymann et al. 
2007). Policy makers from the US and France, for example, urged the OECD already in 
the early 1980s to develop better comparative indicators for assessing the efficiency 
(US) and equality (France) of their education systems. Based on these indicators both 
governments wanted to direct their national education policy into particular directions 
(Martens 2007).  
                                                 
6  This section mainly builds on Jakobi, 2009, in preparation.  
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In addition, nation states throughout the OECD have been facing problems since the 
early 1980s regarding the provision and financing of public education services: tight 
budgets increasingly constrain states’ capacity to meet the ever rising demand of educa-
tion (Daun 2005). This problem becomes even more severe due to the advent of the 
knowledge-based economy, which redefines the relationship between economy and e-
ducation, and thus questions structures and contents of national educational systems 
(Robertson 2005). As a consequence, cooperation among nation states becomes increas-
ingly necessary in a very functional sense in order to seek solutions to commonly shared 
problems. The Bologna Process, for example, is the result of an agreement between the 
four largest countries in Europe, which decided to collaborate in order to overcome na-
tional problems of their higher education systems (Balzer and Rusconi 2007; Toens 
2008, forthcoming). Thus, strategies of other countries became interesting examples or 
blueprints for national policy processes and policy makers saw the need for interna-
tional collaboration (Jakobi 2007a).  
In sum, policy makers assume that many issues cannot be tackled within the national 
domain alone, but require international solutions – often developed in IO forums or the 
organisations themselves. IOs have thus become a tool for diverse problem solving. 
This, in turn, facilitated the development of IOs as knowledge brokers or arenas of in-
ternational exchange (Martens and Jakobi 2007). And even though many IO activities in 
education were initiated by nation states themselves, IOs today have become increas-
ingly independent agents in the education arena (Martens and Wolf 2008, in prepara-
tion). Instead of simply carrying out, what their member states urged them to do, today 
they follow their own interests and agendas, thereby exerting influence back onto their 
member states beyond mere bottom-up initiatives. This adds a primarily international 
cause to the explanation why IOs have become more important in education policy and 
have increased their activities.  
Against this background, we investigate the ‘feedback effect’ of IOs and their enlar-
ged activities on the national level. Such effects have often been assessed by construc-
tivist scholars in IR (Finnemore 1996; Meyer et al. 1997), but still, specific mechanisms 
of these processes are less known. It has become a commonplace in IR literature that 
IOs have different means at hand to influence national policy making and thus, depend-
ing on the specific IO, generate different kinds of outputs. Surprisingly, there are not 
many systematic typologies of IO activities that help assessing the different instruments 
applied in a policy field: Karns and Mingst (2004) mention capacities as linked to in-
formation or monitoring, Rittberger and Zangl (2006) refer to outputs as policy pro-
grammes, operational activities, or information activities. In the case of education, for 
example McNeely and Cha (1994) distinguish between exchange of information, char-
ters and constitutions, standard setting instruments and technical and financial re-
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sources. We ourselves developed a general typology of opinion formation, coordination 
and resources (Jakobi and Martens 2007; Martens and Balzer 2007), and, as regards the 
case of the OECD, we referred to soft mechanisms in education as agenda setting, for-
mulation and coordination (Jakobi and Martens 2007), but also to regulation, financing, 
structuration and persuasion (Jakobi 2007b: 152, based on Braun and Giraud 2003). 
Nonetheless, for assessing all possible ways of how IOs can influence national policy 
making, more comprehensive categories are needed (see Jakobi 2009, in preparation, for 
the following). Ideally, such categories should be generalisable beyond the field of edu-
cation, but also fine-tuned, and moreover linkable to an overarching explanation of gen-
eral global political processes7. In fact, although not labelled as such, Jacobson pursued 
similar goals in an early work (1979). He assessed the development of international eco-
nomic, security and welfare policy, thereby focussing on different IOs and their political 
activities. He distinguished five categories of what we would now call IO governance 
instruments: informational activities, normative activities, rule creating activities, rule-
supervisory activities and operational activities. Informational activities are linked to 
publishing data, promoting policies at conferences or exchanging information. Norma-
tive activities encompass declarations and goals that are non-binding, rule-creating 
functions are linked to binding outcomes. Rule-supervisory functions involve interna-
tional monitoring of national policy development, while operational activities are re-
lated to the resources an IO has at its disposal, such as payments or technical assistance 
(Jacobson 1979: 88-90).  
Even though Jacobson’s typology provides a good starting point for classifying IO 
governance instruments, we suggest modifying his categories in two aspects. Jacobson 
has, on the one hand, an implicit emphasis on binding instruments when he distin-
guishes rule-creating from normative activities, thereby focussing on the process rather 
than on the social result.8 This reflects a predominant approach to focus on hard law that 
                                                 
7  The need for generalisation stems from the fact that IO governance extends across policy field and education is 
only one field among others in which global governance currently occurs. The need for fine-tuned categories re-
lates to the aim to reach a level beyond ‘IOs matter’ by showing through which means they matter most. And the 
need for theoretical linkage relates to ideas of global policy development, in which an IO is only one player 
among others who push forward specific policy aims. 
8  Other authors argue as well that legally binding forms of IO governance are more effective than softer instru-
ments. For example, scholars highlight that the EU can generally exercise a more strongly binding authority than 
the OECD, which is, at least formally, a weakly binding programme organisation (Marcussen 2004; Rittberger 
and Zangl 2003: 32). Such distinction will not be made here, since more generally, the distinction in binding and 
non-binding instruments implies that the binding ones are in some way ‘stronger’ – a question that, in our opin-
ion, should be assessed empirically. But specifically in the field of education a high number of activities exist, 
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has, over time, been supplemented by research on soft law. Since both processes in fact 
create normative standards, it seems more useful to combine the two; we thus refer to 
‘standard setting’ as one particular mode of governance, consisting of normative and 
rule-creating activities. On the other hand, Jacobson subsumes both financing and tech-
nical assistance under the term ‘operational activities’. This does not seem adequate to 
us9, given the fact that technical assistance of UNESCO differs widely, both in terms of 
activities as well as in its addressees, from EU project financing. Thus, following Jacob-
son with slight modifications, we categorise IO instruments as discursive dissemination, 
standard setting, financial means, coordinative activities, and technical assistance (see 
also Table 1).  
(1) Discursive dissemination refers to the capacity of IOs to initiate and influence 
debates on policy issues, also by generating new ideas, concepts and models for policy 
making (Finnemore 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Examples of discursive dis-
semination in the field of education are OECD publications that develop ideas on fi-
nancing education, or material published in the course of the PISA study by which the 
OECD could influence public discussions on the efficiency of national schooling sys-
tems. Compared to the other categories, discursive dissemination is the most compre-
hensive and ontologically distinct, since all others are in fact related to it. For example, 
setting a specific standard requires and reinforces discursive dissemination of that stan-
dard.  
(2) Standard setting refers to formally binding prescription as well as to other norma-
tive activities, since both activities aim at providing rules for state policy. As hard law, 
standard setting is probably the most direct type of governance and encompasses the 
regulations to which states need to adhere due to their membership in a particular or-
ganisation or due to treaties  they signed. As soft law, IOs generate standards for evalua-
tion and mutual scrutiny, which lead to the origination of new constitutive norms and 
are reinforced through normative pressures (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). In the 
field of education, the European Commission today can formulate concrete objectives 
for education policy making as a result of the Lisbon Strategy (European Commission 
2002) and the Open Method of Coordination (OMC); in other policy fields, the EU has 
even hard law at its hand. In both cases, however, standard setting is pursued. 
(3) Financial means refer to the financial resources that IOs can transfer to countries 
for implementing the IO’s favoured programmes. By financial means, an organisation 
                                                                                                                                               
which would be characterised as ‘non-binding instruments’ but are likely to be effective. Thus, it seems useful to 
differentiate between governance instruments on the one hand and their effectiveness on the other. 
9  This is supported by the fact that financing is characterised as a distinct steering instrument on the national level 
(Braun and Giraud 2003). 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 72) 
- 9 - 
finances projects or policy-implementation in the countries. By such financing, incen-
tives are given and local, regional or national implementation may be fostered. In the 
field of education, such financing and its impact is most obvious in the case of the 
World Bank; countries apply for the establishment of a specific educational infrastruc-
ture or programme which has to be compatible with the Bank’s general policy (Jones 
1992). The EU also finances projects that support their policies on different levels, such 
as student exchange programmes or framework programmes. IOs can also simply spon-
sor specific events that they find useful, but which might be less decisive for policy im-
plementation at first sight.  
(4) Coordinative activities refer to an organisation’s capacity to organise and logisti-
cally influence procedures in order to observe and promote policy initiatives and deci-
sions. IOs can give incentives for policy making by managing, directing and speeding 
up the implementations of programmes and projects. In such context, they also execute 
surveillance on whether commonly agreed policy targets are met in the countries. Ex-
amples are meetings in the OECD or the EU’s OMC, where countries exchange ideas 
about the right way to implement policies by bringing together scientific expertise with 
key policy-makers. This type of governance enables IOs to promote and shape organisa-
tional processes by means of bringing together all relevant actors. Therefore, "govern-
ance by co-ordination marks the special capacity of an international organisation to ‘pull 
the strings together’" (Martens et al. 2004: 2).  
(5) Technical assistance refers to the IOs’ capacity to supervise the implementation 
of international policies. This assistance is often prescribed by international treaties or is 
a precondition for financial means and mostly applied to developing countries that try to 
catch up with policies developed in industrialised countries. Technical assistance di-
rectly transfers the knowledge of how to implement and further develop a specific pol-
icy to the national political system. The OECD, in its beginning, had a well developed 
technical assistance project as regards education planning (Papadopoulos 1994) while 
today, this instrument is mainly restricted to agencies working in developing countries, 
as, for example, the World Bank or UNESCO. 
Taken together, this typology provides a more encompassing view on IO governance 
than classifications developed exclusively for the field of education. But even though all 
five governance instruments are applicable in theory, it does not mean that all IOs are 
always making use of them empirically. To the contrary, IOs should have only a selec-
tion of instruments at hand. Also, instruments should differ across policy fields, and 
they should be applicable in a temporarily sequence, e.g. discursive dissemination might 
be a first step of global policy development, concrete financing of projects or technical 
assistance the last one. Regardless of the instruments applied, however, IOs do not enter 
an uncontested field when initiating or realising specific policies, but they face different 
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country-specific national polities, priorities and histories. How far IO governance ca-
pacities can thus be realised and how far the governance instruments really influence 
national politics, depends not only on the IO’s abilities but also on the national precon-
ditions – hereafter called transformation capacities. 
Table 1: Governance Instruments of International Organisations  
Governance Instrument Dominant Function Examples 
Discursive dissemination Establishing ideas UN Promotion of Sustainable Development 
OECD Promotion of Lifelong Learning  
Standard setting Prescribing behaviour UN Recommendations 
OECD Benchmarks 
Financial means Transfer payment World Bank Financing 
EU Project Financing 
Coordinative activities Execute surveillance EU Open Method of Coordination 
OECD Peer Reviewing 
Technical assistance Support structures UNESCO support for education statistics 
UNESCO support for educational planning  
(Source: based on Jakobi 2009, in preparation) 
NATIONAL TRANSFORMATION CAPACITIES  
AS MEDIATORS OF IO INFLUENCE 
By merely focussing only on the international level of governance, authors often assume 
that it is the type of governance IOs exert that makes the difference for the changes on 
the national level, thereby generating a very passive picture of nation states. Yet, despite 
the importance of international factors, we have to consider national strategies, prefer-
ences and ideas that play an important role when it comes to the inclusion of new actors 
in education politics, the re-organisation of political processes or the adoption of new 
policy goals or instruments. These country-specific institutional factors determine 
whether IO governance shows an effect at all, which political dimensions are affected, 
and with which intensity and direction change can take place. Accordingly, we will ar-
gue that the question whether and how far instruments of international organisations 
will show a direct effect is better assessed on the national level by analysing how coun-
tries actually respond to international influences.10  
                                                 
10  On the institutional level, issues of continuity and change have been mainly addressed by arguments of institu-
tional path dependency. The main argument for the existence of path dependency holds that once a country or re-
gion has started down a certain path, it is likely to stay on it in the future, since initial choices are not easily re-
versed, and paths cannot be left without large costs (see Ebbinghaus 2005 for a discussion; Streeck and Thelen 
2005). Institutions are path dependent because of increasing returns encouraging processes where “each step 
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In the literature, two main dimensions of national transformation capacities prevail: 
In a more rationalist perspective, the focus is on actors and their institutional opportuni-
ties and constraints, while in a more constructivist perspective, ideas, norms and identi-
ties are the main ingredients of institutional frameworks. As others have done before us 
(see for example Börzel and Risse 2000), we will combine both approaches in order to 
get a more encompassing picture of national transformation capacities. The actor-
centred perspective is incorporated by making reference to the veto player approach, 
while the constructivist perspective is based on a typology of ideas.  
National Veto Players as Motor or Barrier of Change 
National veto points (see Crepaz and Moser 2004; Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993; 
Schmidt 2000: 351-355) and veto players (Tsebelis 1995; Wagschal 1999) describe a 
country’s potential for political change by means of the formal structure of the national 
political system and its political actors (chambers, president, governments and parties). 
This institutional framework of political decision making aims to explain whether and 
how certain formal characteristics of the political system, for example federalism, are 
likely to promote or hinder changes in the field of education. “The basic idea common 
to all veto player approaches is simple: if some individual or collective actor has veto 
power (that is, under unanimity decision rules), she will use it to further her interests. 
More specifically, she will veto policies that go against her interests“ (Ganghof 2003: 
2). This means that the policy proposal by an IO will be considered by national veto 
players and – depending on their political interests and agendas – be met with resistance 
or support. Veto players may thus hinder or promote policy proposals made by IOs.  
Regarding the difference between veto points and players, the concept of veto points 
is related to the wider institutional framework of the political decision making process. 
A veto point can be described as an institutional opportunity to veto a decision: “Politi-
cal decisions require agreement at several points along the chain of decisions made in 
different arenas. The fate of legislative proposals [...] depends upon the number and 
location of opportunities for veto along this chain. The ability of interest groups to in-
fluence such legislative outcomes depends upon their access to the political representa-
                                                                                                                                               
along a particular path produces consequences which make a path more attractive for the next round” (Pierson 
2000: 5). Through this, institutions provide resistance to pressure for example generated by IO governance that 
might otherwise force actors off a particular path. This institutional path dependency strongly influences the par-
ticular ways in which national governance respond to IO governance instruments. Yet, since our perspective is on 
change rather than on continuity, we propose to concentrate on those particular institutional settings of national 
paths which are likely to promote, but also to hinder change in response to international stimuli, i.e. the transfor-
mation capacities of the national level. 
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tives situated at the ‘weak links’ or veto points in this chain” (Immergut 1992: 396). 
Given that political change is seldom the result of a single decision - rather modern con-
stitutional democracies employ a system of “checks and balances” that requires the 
agreement of several actors - the number of veto points determines the length of the 
decision making chain (Klitgaard 2009, in preparation). Thus, veto points are institu-
tional opportunities to change or block legislation and veto players are those individual 
or collective actors who can strategically use such opportunities. 
Yet, according to Ganghof (2003: 3), a crucial problem of most veto approaches is 
the problem of identification: Scholars have to distinguish real veto points from other 
potentially influential actors. The question is to what extent sets of individuals can be 
treated as collective veto points (for example parties versus party factions), but also 
whether particular powerful actors, such as courts, are real veto players. In order to o-
vercome the problem of identification, we follow Tsebelis’ framework of veto players, 
which builds on a more narrow (formal) definition of veto power and thus aims at over-
coming the distinction among different veto points found in the literature. With Tsebe-
lis’ definition (1995: 301) we define veto players as “individual or collective actors 
whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo”. Accordingly, veto players 
can be differentiated into two categories:  
First, institutional veto players are those political actors specified by the national 
constitution, such as presidents, first chambers, second chambers or senates, or federal-
ism. In this regard, Tsebelis (1995: 302) uses a quite narrow definition and considers 
only those political actors as veto players who have formal veto power; if their veto can 
be overruled they are not counted as such. In the field of higher education, for example, 
this means that the Federal German government has no official veto power anymore 
after the latest reform of the federal framework (Föderalismusreform) in 2007. Since 
then, all veto power lies with the governments of the federal states, i.e. the second 
chamber (Bunderat), which introduces a third level into the two-level game. Moreover, 
according to Tsebelis' “absorption rule” (1995: 309-10), the number of institutional veto 
players depends on their political composition: institutional veto players with different 
political compositions, e.g. party membership, count as distinct players, while different 
institutional veto players with identical composition count only as one veto player. For 
example, if the president’s party controls the chamber/s, too, as it was recently the case 
in the US at the moment, no other institutional veto player should be counted. This ex-
ample illustrates that Tsebelis’ approach allows for more dynamic than a mere sum of 
institutional veto opportunities. In contrast to the veto point approach, countries with a 
presidential system are not necessarily associated with an additional veto player.  
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The second type of veto players are partisan veto players. Given that, with few ex-
ceptions,11 all government coalition members have to approve a governmental policy 
proposal, or in other words have the power to veto it, each party of the government coa-
lition counts as a separate veto player. The reason for this counting rule is that, as simi-
lar as their positions might be, each party competes for election and therefore each party 
in the government coalition has to be perceived as distinct by the electorate and will 
have a different policy position “as means for winning votes” (Tsebelis 1995: 309). In 
contrast, opposition parties do not count as partisan veto players at all, not even in the 
case of minority governments, since they possess no formal veto power. They count 
only indirectly if they control one of the institutional veto players.  
By means of the veto player approach we can thus examine how institutional constel-
lations and individual and collective actors’ interests mediate political change brought 
about by internationalisation in the field of education. It now becomes possible to un-
derstand cross-national differences of education policy reforms. Different veto constel-
lations can, for example, explain why some countries quickly respond to IO governance 
instruments such as reforming their higher education systems in the course of the Bolo-
gna Process, while others proceed more slowly or do not show any political reaction at 
all. Analysing national political actors with their particular interests and preferences 
serves to better understand how the national, yet contested level deals with given IO 
proposals. 
The importance of veto players follows directly from the conception of legislators as 
intentional actors. Whenever we understand behaviour as intentional action, we presume 
that actors are at least minimally rational and that their preferences and beliefs have an 
underlying structure that is at least temporarily “fixed”. This closely resembles a logic 
of expected consequences (March and Olsen 1998), where they rationally choose among 
alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objec-
tives, conscious that other actors are doing likewise. The consequential logic of action 
therefore sees political order as arising from negotiation among rational actors pursuing 
personal preferences or interests in circumstances in which there may be gains to coor-
dinated action. Whether coordination is achieved and the terms of coordination (for ex-
ample, who adopts whose system) depend on the bargaining positions of the actors.  
However, the idea that action is merely driven by the calculation of its consequences 
as measured against prior preferences has long been subject to criticism. In particular, 
linking action exclusively to a logic of consequences seems to ignore the substantial 
                                                 
11  Oversised majority governments would constitute such an exception. However, even in this case all coalition 
parties will try to avoid ignoring or going against the will of the other partners, since would carry certain political 
risks, such as new government formation (Tsebelis 1995: 303-304). 
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role of identities, rules, and institutions in shaping human behaviour. Also Tsebelis ig-
nores this fact since he gives no clear rule as how to detect differences in the prefer-
ences of veto players and the cohesion of these preferences. For example, different par-
ties may have different preferences regarding public education (as exemplified by 
heated debates on tuition fees or the extent and support of private education) or different 
positions toward school organisation (as in Germany, the discussion on tripartite or 
comprehensive compulsory schooling). Ganghof (2003: 3) states in this regard that once 
the relevant veto players are identified, their preferences have to be determined – how-
ever roughly – since particular predictions or explanations of political change based on 
the veto player constellation depend crucially on such preference attributions. Within 
the tradition of a logic of appropriateness, actions are seen to follow rules that associate 
particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for 
action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and mo-
re general concepts of self and situations (March and Olsen 1998). We therefore argue 
that in order to understand policy preferences of veto players in particular countries we 
have to refer to national ideas about education. The combination of ideas and the veto 
player approach as national transformation capacities allows for overcoming the theo-
retical limitations of Tsebelis' approach. 
Ideas about Education as Mental Road Maps 
As a cultural legacy, ideas are embedded both in the institutional structure and the col-
lective interpretation scheme of a country and predetermine a country’s further devel-
opment to a certain extent by making some paths more likely than others. This is why 
we regard ideas about education as important elements of a country’s transformation 
capacity. Taking up Weber’s “switchman” metaphor, we thus argue that guiding princi-
ples (Lepsius 1995; Lepsius 1997) and interpretation frames (Gerhards and Rucht 2000) 
or cultural accounts (Meyer, Boli and Thomas 1994) “determin[e] the tracks along 
which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest” (Weber 1968: 268). In this 
sense, we assume that ideas about education have a long lasting influence on the prefer-
ences and interests of national veto players.  
When theorising the role of ideas for change processes of education policy making, it 
is useful to analytically differentiate several levels of concretion. According to Gold-
stein and Keohane (1993) ideas or beliefs, as they call it, comprise three different levels 
of concretion: world views refer to ideas deeply rooted in culture containing basic as-
sumptions about the world as some sort of cosmology. Today, one of the most persistent 
world views about education is probably that education is a central value and as such a 
public good in modern societies (1993; 2005). Thus, world views may cover the ulti-
mate goals of education or legitimise narratives of education itself. On a more concrete 
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level, there are principled beliefs, which state what is right and what is wrong or rather 
what is legitimate and what is illegitimate behaviour in a normative sense. Compulsory 
schooling or free education would be examples for principled beliefs which fit in the 
broader world view of education as a public good. As a third category, Goldstein and 
Keohane refer to causal beliefs, which are beliefs about means-end relationships. Causal 
beliefs are linked to the actor’s knowledge or assumptions of how to reach a given goal. 
Causal beliefs about public education become visible, for example, in country-specific 
education finance or political reform strategies which are meant to introduce more per-
formance-based funding measures. Differences in causal beliefs between two countries 
may account for the adoption of different political strategies, although the overarching 
goals may be the same.12 
In this sense, ideas function as mental road maps. The world views contain the over-
arching goals associated with education. On a more concrete level, the principled and 
causal beliefs define what choices are legitimate and causal adequate in reaching the 
overarching goals. Ideas about education certainly do not stop at national borders; nev-
ertheless we assume that one can identify certain idiosyncratic mixtures and composi-
tions of world views, principled and causal believes across different countries. Looking 
at the history of education in society, one can distinguish three different world views 
about the overarching goals of education as a public good: (1) Education as a means to 
promote the cultural and moral integration of the people aims at a homogeneous and 
loyal population. All over the world, the modern state achieved the idea of political in-
tegration by introducing a national curriculum and by establishing formal education 
institutions that created a common language and disseminated the idea of a common 
history of the people through education (Archer 1979; Smith 1986); (Meyer, Ramirez 
and Soysal 1992). (2) Education as a means to increase the returns of private and public 
human capital investment in education aims at permanent growth of productivity and 
wealth of the nation. Since the rise of capitalism, education has been viewed as a valu-
able instrument to improve competitiveness of the national economy, a tool to produce 
grand surpluses and wealth by coordinated human capital investment (Gellner 1983; 
                                                 
12  Empirically, it is not easy to distinguish between principled and causal beliefs for almost every principled belief 
implies some kind of means-end assumption and so one could question this analytical distinction. But when it is 
turned the other way round, it may be the case that causal knowledge is in conflict with shared principled beliefs. 
For example, IOs may spread the causal belief that tuition fees are an adequate response to financial constraints in 
the higher education sector. This belief may conflict with the principled belief of the national political actors that 
education should be free. In countries, where this conflict occurs, we can expect that the adaptation of impulses 
from the international level takes more time than in countries, where this conflict does not occur, or even that the 
impulse is not translated in national policy at all. 
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Kiker 1966; Mann 1993). (3) Education as a social right aims at overcoming the repro-
duction of social inequalities by increasing each individual's chances for societal par-
ticipation and inclusion through education (Marshall 1965 [1949]). 
Although each of these world views can probably be found in the political discourse 
of nearly every country, we will use this classification in order to make cross-national 
variations visible. We expect cross-national variations in two respects. First, countries 
differ in the extent of stressing one or more of these ideas as compared to the others. For 
example, some countries clearly favour the function of education as human capital as 
compared to education as provider of equal opportunities. Second, the policy output of 
these overarching ideas behind education, i.e. the precise policy instruments and set-
tings established in the field of education, varies strongly across nations. Thus, particu-
larly on the level of principled and causal beliefs countries differ in their cultural ideas 
of how to translate the world views on education into actual education policy making. 
Besides the abstract level of world views, principled and causal beliefs, ideas can be 
more “coagulated” into institutional structures and thus influence the incentive structure 
of the political actors and the transaction costs of a political choice. "Ideas have a last-
ing influence on politics through their incorporation into the terms of political debates; 
but the impact of some set of ideas may be mediated by the operation of institutions in 
which the ideas are embedded. Once the ideas have influenced organisational design, 
their influence will be reflected in the incentives of those in the organisation and those 
whose interests are served by it. […] In this sense ideas can have an impact even when 
no one genuinely believes in them as principled or causal statements" (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993: 20). This statement points back to the importance of the institutional set-
up of political decision making, which is often coined as veto points or players. By inte-
grating both approaches, we can therefore fill important gaps that are entailed in the 
separate analysis of veto players and ideas. 
Conceptualising veto players and ideas as national transformation capacities thus al-
lows us to theoretically combine two logics of action (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; 
March and Olsen 1998), a rationalist and a constructivist. Although there is some ten-
dency for scholars to follow one or the other, the two principles are not mutually exclu-
sive. As a result, political action generally cannot be explained exclusively in terms of 
consequences or appropriateness. Political actors are constituted by their interests, by 
which they evaluate their expected consequences, as well as by the ideas embedded in 
their identities and political institutions. We argue that both have to be taken into ac-
count when analysing the potential reactions of nation states to IO governance. The im-
portance of veto players follows directly from the conception of legislators as inten-
tional actors. However, in order to understand policy preferences of veto players in cer-
tain setting we have to refer to national principled beliefs about education policy mak-
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ing as well as to causal beliefs of education policy makers about how these can be 
achieved by certain policies. In sum, both logics of actions are important when analys-
ing the dynamics of changing education policy making on the national level.  
DYNAMICS OF CHANGE OF NATIONAL EDUCATION POLICY MAKING 
By combining national and international determinants of change, we argue that national 
education policy making does not simply change as a consequence of the impetus given 
by IO governance instruments, but that national veto players and ideas about education 
act as mediating transformation capacities. The question is now how such a two-level 
game translates into political change, i.e. into changing education policies and politics. 
It might occur, for example, that an IO initiates only minor changes in one country, whi-
le another country encounters a major change resulting in a paradigm shift. But when 
comparing both change processes we might see that both countries are converging to-
wards a common model of education policy making, as proposed by an IO (see also 
Heichel and Sommerer 2007; Holzinger, Jörgens and Knill 2007; Holzinger and Knill 
2005). In this perspective, IO governance instruments have the capacity to cause chan-
ges not only in one, but in many countries – with the result that they increasingly be-
come more alike. In our theoretical model, IO governance therefore represents an im-
portant driving force towards the convergence of national education policy making. This 
last section thus deals with the relationship between convergence and divergence of 
education policy making across countries. 
The most basic way of assessing convergence of national education policy making is 
to analyse the extent to which policies of different countries have become more similar 
to each other over time. In the literature, two different approaches to assess policy con-
vergence can be differentiated that are important for studying the influence of IO gov-
ernance for national education policy making (see Heichel, Pape and Sommerer 2005: 
831 for the following).13 Starting with the logic that comes closest to a common under-
standing of convergence, a first approach analyses the decrease in variation of domestic 
policies. This is currently observable in the field of higher education, where many coun-
tries introduce tuition fees in order to deal with tight state budgets and the rising number 
of students (Kohlrausch and Leuze 2007). The variation in funding sources is thereby 
becoming more similar between countries. This measurement of convergence is called 
                                                 
13  There are two further approaches, beta- and gamma-convergence, which can be found in the literature, but which 
are not relevant for assessing the influence of IO governance in the field of education. Beta-convergence occurs 
when poor economies grow faster than rich ones and is named after the growth coefficient. For the analysis of 
gamma-convergence, country rankings for different points in time are compared to assess the mobility of coun-
tries (Heichel et al. 2005: 832).  
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sigma-convergence, named after the algebraic notion for variance. In its classic form, a 
decreasing coefficient of variance (also known as dispersion index) indicates conver-
gence. For more qualitative studies measuring the similarity of policies or regulatory 
instruments, sigma-convergence as "growing together" is also the basic logic.  
However, sigma-convergence does not necessarily imply that IO governance is di-
recting national education policy making into a particular direction, i.e. the sources of 
convergence are left out. This fact is better captured by a second measurement of con-
vergence, the so-called delta-convergence. Delta-convergence is based on the decreas-
ing distance of policies towards an exemplary model, like a model promoted by an in-
ternational organisation. Especially in the Bologna Process, such a model has been 
made very explicit, since it proposes to introduce a two-cycles degree system of particu-
lar length, accompanied by accreditation and quality assurance, until 2010 (Balzer and 
Rusconi 2007). Delta-convergence would occur the more countries restructure their 
higher education systems according to this proposed model. But also IOs such as the 
OECD, which do not propose such explicit policy measures, aim at directing reforms 
into a particular direction, for example by repeatedly arguing for an increase in higher 
education graduates or more competition among education providers.  
By developing various governance instruments for education matters, IOs have the 
capacity to guide education policy making of their member states into a particular direc-
tion, towards a common model. Thus, IOs function as entrepreneurs of (delta-) conver-
gence. The pressure towards convergence can take the form of imposition, which refers 
to constellations where countries or IOs force other countries to adopt certain policies 
by exploiting asymmetries in political or economic power, for example through finan-
cial means as in the case of the World Bank. But convergence can also take place in the 
form of harmonisation of national policies through international or supranational law or 
constitutive norms. Finally, cross-national policy convergence can simply be caused by 
transnational communication, which can be fostered by coordinative activities or discur-
sive dissemination by IOs (Holzinger, Jörgens and Knill 2007; Holzinger and Knill 
2005). We therefore assume that the governance capacity of IOs has the potential to 
push national education policy making into a particular direction, towards a proposed 
model, thereby stimulating delta convergence of national paths (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Theoretical model for explaining changing education policy making 
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However, whether IO governance leads to a transformation of the nation state in the 
field of education does not solely depend on the type of IO governance, but also on a 
country's capacity and willingness to respond to international influences with reforms in 
the field of education. Both, expectations and preferences of political actors as well as 
national identities and meanings of education will have influence whether IO govern-
ance shows an effect at all, which political dimensions are affected, and with which in-
tensity and direction change can take place. Regarding the explanatory factors of con-
vergence, empirical studies point to the fact that causes of convergence are often based 
on international factors, while explanations for limited convergence or divergence are 
often rooted in national (institutional) factors (Heichel, Pape and Sommerer 2005: 825). 
Thus, national transformation capacities might hinder convergence and lead to a con-
tinuation or even an increase in divergence across countries.  
Following Tsebelis’ line of reasoning, we expect political stability in the field of e-
ducation to be more likely the more veto players are involved in the decision making 
process, the further their political interests lie apart, and the more coherent the positions 
are within each veto player (Tsebelis 1995: 293). As a result of the formal structure of 
national political systems, countries with a stronger veto constellation (i.e. a large num-
ber of veto player with diverging political interests, but a high level of internal coher-
ence) will show higher political stability and thus a lower pace and extent in reforming 
their national education systems as compared to countries with a higher potential for 
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political change following from a weaker veto constellation. Convergence towards an 
education model promoted by international organisations will thus primarily occur be-
tween countries with similar levels of veto power. 
However, as the discussion of education ideas have demonstrated, political actors act 
in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, 
anticipated, and accepted. Therefore, IO education policy proposals are likely to be ac-
cepted by national veto players the better they fit with national ideas of education. In 
line with Börzel and Risse (2000) we expect political change according to the proposi-
tions given by IOs to become more likely the higher the congruence between interna-
tional and national ideas of education is. Particularly by the development of interna-
tional standards for evaluation and mutual scrutiny IOs are able to originate new consti-
tutive norms which nation states might comply with simply on the basis of appropriate-
ness or perceived legitimacy. An example hereof is the idea of “efficiency” that led to 
an unproblematic introduction of national quality assurance and accreditation agencies 
in the course of the Bologna Process. In a similar vein, through discursive dissemination 
IOs initiate and influence public debates on educational issues, which might turn into 
constitutive as well as regulative rules. These cognitive processes might lead to stronger 
policy changes than binding regulations, since the political actors adopting them seek 
legitimacy and norm compliance based on social interaction and experience (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977). Thus, the discursive policy proposals made by the OECD might have a 
stronger impact on national education policy making than more binding EU regulation 
based on the OMC education. However, if national and international guiding principles 
lie further apart, education reforms in line with IO proposals will be met with more op-
position, as exemplified in the German debates on comprehensive schooling. Only if the 
principled beliefs about education themselves change on the national level and through 
this become more similar to the ideas proposed by IOs, reforms of national education 
policies will again become more likely. In the extreme case that the ideas of IOs and 
nation states are completely incompatible, IO governance might not be effective at all.  
Taken together, we assume that if the congruence between education ideas promoted 
by international organisations and national principled beliefs about education is rather 
high, then changes of education policy making in the direction of a particular model 
becomes more likely. The promotion of particular ideas or goals for education policy 
making through IOs only translate into particular policy outcomes if there is a reason-
able fit between the ideas of the international level and the principled beliefs prevailing 
on the national level. The compatibility between international and national ideas about 
education influences the development of national reform projects by means of facilitat-
ing or hindering political socialisation and learning processes. Yet, this means that IOs 
do not have the capacity to facilitate convergence of all their member states as well. 
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Only those countries sharing similar principled beliefs about education are likely to re-
act in a similar manner to IO governance and therefore are supposed to converge more 
strongly than countries with different ideas about education. 
Taking the effect of veto players and national ideas of education together, conver-
gence of national education policy or politics towards a particular model promoted by 
IOs becomes more likely if international and national ideas are more congruent and fe-
wer numbers of veto players are in power. On the other hand, the more veto players are 
involved in the decision making process and the more different their principled or cau-
sal beliefs (i.e. preferences) are, the more difficult policy changes will be, since reforms 
have to be approved by all and acceptable compromises will be reached with more diffi-
culty. Only if in systems with many veto players the ideas about education are highly 
congruent with the ones promoted by the international level, reforms towards a particu-
lar policy model will be pushed through nevertheless. Convergence of countries with 
many veto players might therefore be the result, even though at a slower pace. The re-
sult of these reforms will again be more stable than in systems with few veto players.  
To sum up, only by analysing the interplay between IO governance instruments and 
national transformation capacities, it will become possible to establish whether national 
education policy making will eventually converge across countries. Even though IOs 
have the capacity to lead to changes of both, education politics and policies, national 
transformation capacities are decisive for the scope and extent of change taking actually 
place.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper set out to develop an analytical framework for analysing changes in national 
education policy making as a response to the increasing influence of international or-
ganisations in the field of education. It started off with the observation that since the 
early 1990s, international organisations have become important players in the arena of 
education policy making. The increasing internationalisation of education was origi-
nally caused by national policy makers themselves. As political response to the national 
and international pressures originating from economic and technological globalisation 
or national reform log jams, they shifted some elements of national education policy 
making to the international level. The aim of this governance shift was to rebut the he-
gemony of global economic forces, but also to discharge the modern state from some of 
its burden and responsibility (Welch 2001) in order to evade loyalty and redistribution 
conflicts (Weymann et al. 2007).  
However, IOs increasingly became independent agents in the field of education, fol-
lowing their own interests and agendas. Accordingly, the increasing internationalisation 
of education led to a feedback effect back from the international to the national level, 
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thereby changing the mode of governance in this policy field: nation states increasingly 
loose their prerogative in the field of education, while IOs gain in importance. By de-
veloping various governance instruments and by proposing the same policy reforms to 
their member states, IOs have the capacity to act as entrepreneurs of (delta-
)convergence. But at the same time, IO governance does not hit uncontested grounds. 
Whether or not the various governance instruments will eventually lead to a conver-
gence of national policy making is better analysed by making reference to national insti-
tutional settings. Conceptualising veto players and ideas as national transformation ca-
pacities allows us to theoretically combine two logics of action, a rationalist and a con-
structivist. We argued that both have to be taken into account when analysing the poten-
tial reactions of nation states to IO governance. In order to understand policy prefer-
ences of national veto players we have to refer to national principled beliefs about edu-
cation policy making as well as the causal beliefs of education policy makers about how 
certain goals can be achieved by certain policies. 
By taking into account the interplay between governance instruments, veto players 
and ideas of education it analytically becomes possible to disentangle the international 
and national determinants of change in the field of education. Yet, in the end, it remains 
an empirical question whether international or national forces will dominate the field of 
education policy making. The nation state was by definition exclusive: citizenship and 
wealth of the nation are not shared with the rest of the world and education is in princi-
ple an instrument for achieving national goals. This exclusiveness is challenged by the 
emergence of IOs. Some initial empirical findings point to the fact that the influence of 
IOs in the field of education is merely complementary to national policy making. For 
example, while IOs are charged with the development of comparative indicators 
(OECD) or concepts (World Bank and the International Labour Organization ILO) in 
education, nation states retain the responsibility of whether and how to reform their e-
ducational systems in response to such comparative assessments (Jakobi 2007). Yet, 
other developments imply that IO initiatives also stand in conflict with national interests 
(Weymann et al. 2007). For example, by limiting the power of nation states to discrimi-
nate against foreign private service suppliers, the General Agreement of Trades in Ser-
vices (GATS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) restricts the scope for public 
choice in matters of education services (Scherrer 2007). Overall, the specific conse-
quences of these developments for education policy making are yet to be examined. 
Whether the impact of IOs will impinge uniformly upon different national systems and 
finally lead to convergence will require thorough cross-national comparisons with a 
large number of countries. Such research would provide valuable insights as regards the 
relative importance of the internationalisation of education for the transformation of the 
nation state. 
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